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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
ROBERT TODD WHITE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920248-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first 
degree felony criminal conviction from the district court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the search warrant affidavit provide probable cause for 
the no-knock nighttime search warrant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In assessing this issue, this Court should read the search 
warrant and affidavit "in a common sense manner and as a whole," 
State v, Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah App.)(citation omitted), 
cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and determine whether the 
affidavit establishes probable cause for the no-knock nighttime 
warrant. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14. The standard 
of review of the search warrant affidavit is discussed further in 
Point I of this brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
Utah Constitution, Article I section 1 
Utah Constitution, Article I section 7 
Utah Constitution, Article I section 14 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum. Supp.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-3 (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-6 (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2) (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-12 (1990 Repl. Vol.). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State originally charged Mr. White with one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute (R. 16-17). 
Defense counsel moved to suppress evidence seized in 
violation of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
fourth amendment to,the United States Constitution (R. 21-24). 
After an evidentiary hearing and the submission of memoranda by the 
parties, the trial court entered a memorandum decision denying the 
motion to suppress (R. 66). 
Mr. White entered a no contest conditional plea to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance, explicitly reserving 
the right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress (R. 73, 76-82). The trial court sentenced Mr. White to a 
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term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined Mr. 
White $5,000, but then suspended all but $500 of the fine (with a 
25% surcharge), and placed Mr. White on probation for eighteen 
months (R. 86-87). The trial court stayed this sentence pending 
this appeal, granting a certificate of probable cause (R. 86, 94-95). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search warrant for 
evidence of drug possession and intent to distribute on the basis of 
an affidavit submitted by Detective Bill McCarthy, which apparently 
was not clarified or supplemented on the record prior to the 
issuance of the warrant. A copy of the search warrant and affidavit 
contained in the district court pleadings file are in Appendix 2 to 
this brief. 
The no-knock nighttime search warrant was to be executed 
on the premises known as a 3720 South 3375 
West, the duplex on the west side of the road, 
372 0 is the southern most half of the duplex, the 
apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on 
the front of the premises, to include all 
containers, rooms, attics, and basements found 
therein. 
(R. 25). 
The affidavit indicates the names of two occupants of the 
premises to be searched (as determined by utility company records) 
and mentions vehicles belonging to other occupants at the premises 
to be searched (R. 32), but alleges no probable cause as to which 
occupant(s) of the premises to be searched was/were involved in 
illegal drugs (R. 28-34). 
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The affidavit seeks the warrant to search for evidence of 
possession of illegal drugs, and possession with intent to 
distribute, on the basis of the detective's personal observation of 
what he viewed as vehicular traffic consistent with drug trafficking 
near the premises to be searched ("vehicles arrive and stay a very 
short period of time"), and on the basis of information from two 
confidential sources. The first confidential source had not 
witnessed any drug transactions in the premises to be seized, but 
was married to someone "the spouse," who allegedly bought cocaine at 
the premises to be searched over a six month period prior to the 
search, and had driven the spouse to the premises to be searched 
when the spouse obtained cocaine, and had been told by the spouse 
that persons inside the premises to be searched were the spouse's 
source of cocaine. The second confidential source had seen the 
spouse of the first confidential source at the premises to be 
searched and knew of the spouse's history of cocaine abuse (R. 
30-31). The affidavit also mentions a "second family member" who 
had indicated that the spouse had a cocaine problem and had admitted 
to buying cocciine from the premises to be searched (R. 31) . 
The ciffidavit indicates that the first confidential source 
was reliable because the source's experiences were first hand and 
personal, becciuse the source had not been promised or paid anything, 
and because the source was corroborated by information provided by 
the second source (R. 30) . 
The affidavit indicates that the second confidential source 
was reliable because the source's information was first hand, 
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because the source was a relative of the spouse, and because the 
spouse had an arrest record involving drug offenses. 
The affidavit does not make any indication as to the 
reliability of the second family member. 
The affidavit and warrant seek authorization to search for 
and seize drug paraphernalia, packaging supplies and records, 
residency recordsf and currency in proximity to drugs (R. 26) . The 
warrant does not seek to search for or seize any drugs (R. 26) . 
Nevertheless, the affidavit alleges that a no-knock warrant was 
necessary because "the property being sought pursuant to this 
warrant/affidavit is very easily destroyed." (R. 33). 
The affidavit also alleges as justification for the 
no-knock warrant that "more and more narcotics dealers are arming 
themselves to protect the sales operations from other 
dealers/users," that the detective firmly believed no-knock searches 
to be safer in drug cases, and that the supplier had threatened the 
spouse in the event of police intervention (R. 33). The pre-printed 
portion of the affidavit indicates that a no-knock search was 
necessary because, "physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given; or the property sought may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted. This danger is believed to exist because: 
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT." (R. 34). 
The affidavit alleges that a nighttime search was necessary 
because the busiest time of drug trafficking was in the evening 
hours (R. 32). The pre-printed portion of the affidavit indicates 
that the nighttime search was necessary "because there is reason to 
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believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered or for other good reason 
to wit: SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT." (R. 34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because of the danger posed by no-knock nighttime searches, 
and the concomitant need for adequate assessment of affidavits 
seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants, this Court should hold 
under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution that no 
deference is afforded to magistrates on review of the issuance of 
no-knock nighttime search warrants. 
When reading the affidavit in this case "in a common sense 
manner and as a whole," Rowe, supra, this Court can see that the 
affidavit fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of the 
no-knock nighttime search warrant. Facial flaws and discrepancies 
in the warrant and affidavit that were never clarified by the 
magistrate prior to the issuance of the warrant preclude a finding 
of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The 
affidavit fails to establish the statutory predicates for the 
issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant. 
The foregoing problems with the affidavit and warrant 
preclude a finding of a "substantial basis" for affirming the 
magistrate under federal standards. 
Because the "barebones" affidavit was patently inadequate 
to justify the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search warrant, 
the search cannot be justified under the federal "good faith" 
-6 -
exception to the exclusionary rule, which does not apply under the 
Utah Constitution. 
The evidence seized pursuant to the no-knock nighttime 
search warrant should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DEFER TO THE MAGISTRATE, 
BUT SHOULD REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT SEEKING A 
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Under the fourth amendment, the United States Supreme Court 
has indicated that reviewing courts are to grant a magistrate's 
issuance of a search warrant great deference and review for a 
"substantial basis" for the issuance of the warrant, rather than for 
probable cause, theorizing that if reviewing courts scrutinize 
warrant affidavits too closely, that will somehow discourage police 
from seeking warrants prior to conducting searches. See Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
The biggest problem with the deference afforded to the 
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is that this 
deference undercuts the critical role of meaningful judicial review 
in enforcing citizens' rights to privacy. The historical importance 
of meaningful judicial review of the issuance of warrants can be 
appreciated through review of the appendix to State v. Rowe. 806 
P.2d 730, 740-743 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). Police officers preparing search warrant affidavits 
and magistrates issuing warrants are most likely to do the best job 
of upholding the constitutions if they are stimulated to do so by 
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meaningful judicial review. Id. at 743. Rather than requiring 
police and magistrates to follow the constitutional requirements of 
securing search warrants based on probable cause prior to searches, 
with the "substantial basis" test, the United States Supreme Court 
tacitly informs police officers and magistrates that if the officers 
and magistrates will at least file the paperwork before the 
searches, the courts may be willing to look the other way if the 
paperwork is substantively lacking in probable cause. See State v. 
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)("The 
stated reason [for deferring to the magistrates7 probable cause 
finding] ... is to encourage the use of warrants. ... It should be 
reason enough to rigidly require the use of warrants that the 
Constitution requires them and further requires that they be 
supported by probable cause.")(citations omitted). 
Another problem with the deference afforded to the 
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is the vagueness of 
the "substantial basis" test. Search warrants should only issue if 
the search warrant affidavits establish probable cause, by asserting 
facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is 
"a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983). Yet under the United States Supreme Court's standards, 
reviewing courts are to read the affidavits for a "substantial 
basis" for the issuance of the search warrants and are expressly not 
to review for probable cause. Id. at 236. The "substantial basis" 
test is abstruse. "Either an affidavit establishes probable cause 
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or it does not." State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 836 (Utah App. 
1991)(Orme, J., concurring). 
Under the Utah statutory scheme, it cannot be said that 
magistrates should be deferred to because they develop expertise 
through repeated exposure to search warrant affidavits. See State 
v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830f 835 (Utah App. 1991)(Ormef J. 
concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to magistrates might be 
justified by their expertise developed through repeated experience 
with search warrant affidavits). In seeking search warrants, police 
may approach any justice, judge, or justice of the peace in this 
state. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum. Supp.)(allowing all 
judges and justices of any court to act as magistrates). As the 
Court reviewing many search warrant affidavits, and as the Court 
composed of seven magistrates, this Court is in a position to take 
judicial notice of the fact that Utah magistrates do not uniformly 
have the opportunity to develop expertise in issuing search 
warrants. It appears that those magistrates with the most 
experience in evaluating the affidavits obtain that experience 
because the police most often solicit search warrants from these 
select magistrates. Judicial review is most important in these 
circumstances, to insure the neutrality and detachment of the 
magistrates. 
The scope of information available to the magistrates does 
not provide a basis for deferring to the magistrates. See State v. 
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah App. 1991)(Orme, J. 
concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to magistrates might be 
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justified because magistrates have the opportunity to clarify 
affidavits whem they are presented, and appellate courts may not be 
privy to the information available to the magistrate, but stating, 
"On the other hand, such explanations should be made of record even 
if only by appropriate interlineation of the affidavit.11). Under 
the Utah statutory scheme, magistrates are allowed to receive 
evidence in support of search warrants in written form or to record 
the evidence verbatim and have the record transcribed. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl.). In these circumstances, the 
magistrates should not be privy to information unavailable to 
reviewing courts. The fact that the magistrates have the statutory 
opportunity to clarify on the record evidence in support of search 
warrants demonstrates that Utah magistrates have the opportunity to 
insure the propriety of the issuance of search warrants, and are not 
somehow handicapped in comparison to reviewing courts. 
Under the Utah statutory scheme, it cannot be said that 
magistrates should be deferred to because they are at an 
institutional disadvantage and lack the resources of reviewing 
courts. See State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah App. 
1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to 
magistrates might be justified because magistrates operate at an 
institutional disadvantage, with less time and fewer resources than 
are available to appellate judges.). In Utah, police have the 
opportunity to forum shop. Every justice, judge and justice of the 
peace is authorized to act as a magistrate. The fact that the 
police may choose to patronize the magistrates with the least 
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resources is reason for meaningful appellate review, rather than 
reason for deference to the magistrates. Further, evaluation of 
search warrant affidavits does not require great resources—it 
simply requires a thoughtful reading of the affidavits and 
clarification on the record when necessary. A lack of magisterial 
resources provides no justification for compromising the fundamental 
constitutional rights at stake in search and seizure cases. 
It appears that none of the United States Supreme Court 
cases directing reviewing courts to defer to the magistrates 
involves no-knock nighttime search warrants. This country has a 
long history of reprobation of no-knock nighttime searches. See 
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958). No-knock nighttime 
search warrants pose extreme dangers to searching officers and 
others inside or near the premises to be searched and involve an 
extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the home. See 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11, 
(Utah App.)(main opinion and concurring opinion of Garff, J.) 
(discussing the dangers posed by no-knock nighttime search 
warrants), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The unique 
threats posed by no-knock nighttime search warrants call for intense 
judicial review and counsel against deference to the magistrates. 
See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah App.)(Garff, J., 
concurring)("[W]henever a 'canned,7 or pre-printed affidavit is 
presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative 
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying 
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the search warrant. Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the 
affidavit are insufficient. This is particularly critical when the 
warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home."), 
cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 
700, 703-04 (Utah 1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining the 
need for judicial scrutiny of no-knock searches). 
Neutral and detached assessment, and thorough review of 
affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants are crucial. 
The serious need for independent evaluation of affidavits seeking 
no-knock nighttime search warrants is demonstrated by the testimony 
of the detective who drafted the affidavit successfully obtaining a 
no-knock nighttime search warrant in this case: 
Last nighttime I did, someone got killed, and he 
was supposed to be asleep. So vou take your best 
pick. I firmly believe it's safer at night if 
there's going to be violence. 
(T. 29)(emphasis added). It is important to note that the dangers 
posed by no-knock nighttime searches threaten police officers and 
other innocent people. When Detective McCarthy indicated that 
no-knock searches are safer for police and innocent people, the 
trial court responded, 
I find that absolutely amazing[.] ... [I]f 
you kick down somebody's door in the middle of 
the night, and you're not in uniform, and I 
assume swat teams are in their black uniforms, 
and have police on the back, and not on the 
front[.] ... 
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But you7re going in in the dark, and you have 
flashlights, maybe you have flashlights, maybe 
you don't[.] 
• • • • 
And now that's safer, breaking into somebody's 
house, kicking down their door in the middle of 
the night, when you don't know who's in there? 
There could be somebody in there with their 
family and little children. Why isn't the person 
in there entitled to think, well, here comes a 
bunch of crazy people that are going to kill and 
rape my family, and take action? Why is that 
safer for a police officer? Looks to me like 
you're just asking to get shot? 
(R. 67-68). 
Numerous Utah cases have recognized that it is appropriate 
for Utah courts to decide search and seizure cases on the basis of 
independent Utah law. See Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 
1939)(decided under Article I section 14; striking statute 
purporting to allow search warrant affidavits based on the belief of 
the affiant, rather than stating the underlying facts). See also 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991); State v. LaRocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 465-473 (Utah 1990) (plurality) ; State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
188, 192-93 (Utah 1986); State v. Hvqh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 
1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Because federal deference to magistrates undercuts 
important rights established by Article I section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and is improper in the context of the Utah statutory 
scheme, this Court should hold that affidavits in support of the 
no-knock nighttime search warrants are reviewed for probable cause, 
without deference to the magistrates. Constitution of Utah, 
Article I section 14. 
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II. 
THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE 
OR A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT. 
A. THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH, OR A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT. 
1. Search warrant affidavits must provide sufficient facts from 
which a magistrate may make an independent finding of probable cause. 
This Court set forth the federal law on how a magistrate is 
to assess search warrant affidavits for probable cause, in State v. 
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (1991), explaining, 
Probable cause is to be determined by the 
totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
2332-33 (1983). 
Under this analysis, the magistrate must 
"make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity7 
and basis of knowledge of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 
238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. 
Id. at 832-33 (citations omitted). 
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test has 
not wholly supplanted the Aguilar-Spinelli test in the evaluation of 
affidavits baised on information provided by informants. For 
instance, in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985), the court 
stated, 
[I]n State v. Bailey, [675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 
1984),] we observed that even under the Gates 
"totality of the circumstances" standard, 
compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines 
might be necessary to establish the requisite 
"fair probability" that the evidence sought 
actually exists and can be found where the 
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informant so states. However, in other cases, "a 
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's 
knowledge, veracity and reliability may be 
required, if the circumstances as a whole 
indicate that the informant's report is 
truthful." rBailey, at 1205-06]. 
Id. at 1101-02 (footnotes omitted). When the totality of 
circumstances indicates the truthfulness of the informant's report, 
the showing of the informant's basis of knowledge and veracity and 
reliability may be "less strong," but there must still be some 
showing of each of these things. Id. 
Affidavits relying on police informants, rather than named 
citizen informants, logically require heightened scrutiny. In State 
v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846 (Utah 1972), the court explained, "Recent 
case law has acknowledged that a different rationale exists for 
establishing the reliability of named citizen informers as opposed 
to unnamed police informers, who are frequently criminals. Those in 
the latter category often proffer information in exchange for some 
concession, payment, or simply out of revenge against the subject; 
under such circumstances, it is proper to demand some evidence of 
their credibility or reliability." Id. at 848 (emphasis added and 
deleted). The court indicated that the testimony of police 
informers is viewed with "rigid scrutiny." Jd. Accord State v. 
Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286-287 and n.4 (Utah App. 1990)(police 
informant testimony may require showing of "veracity, reliability, 
and basis of knowledge" if circumstances do not "readily indicate 
the truthfulness of the informant."). 
Search warrant affidavits must provide sufficient factual 
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allegations for the magistrate to make an independent factual 
assessment of probable cause. Our state supreme court recognized 
the importance of the exercise of independent factual assessment by 
magistrates in Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939). Acting 
under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the court 
struck a statute authorizing the issuance of search warrants on the 
basis of the affiant's belief of facts, stating, 
"A warrant to search and seize, which follows 
upon a statement based solely upon the belief of 
the affiant, rests upon the reasoning of the 
affiant, based upon the secret facts of which he 
may have knowledge, and the conclusion which 
results from such reasoning is affiant's, not 
that of the judicial officer. The judicial 
process to ascertain probable cause is then 
transferred from the judicial officer to the 
affiant. The Constitution permits no such thing." 
Id. at 924-925 (citation omitted). 
Numerous other cases decided under federal law have 
recognized thctt, in the absence of sufficient factual bases in 
search warrant affidavits, magistrates cannot act with the requisite 
detachment and neutrality in issuing search warrants. See 
Giordanello v., United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958) (arrest 
warrant); Acruilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 111-14 (1964); 
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) ; Illinois v. 
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). 
Evidence seized under warrants obtained by magistrates7 
11
 rubber stamping" of "barebones" affidavits must be suppressed; the 
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply when 
the police proceed on the basis of such affidavits and warrants. 
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State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah App. 1989); State 
v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted. 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
2. The affidavit is inadequate to show probable cause for the 
search, or a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant. 
Certain fundamental problems apparent on the face of the 
search warrant and affidavit indicate that, in issuing the no-knock 
nighttime search warrant without further clarification, the 
magistrate was acting as a rubber stamp for Detective McCarthy, 
rather than as a neutral and detached arbiter of probable cause. 
The following flaws in the affidavit and warrant demonstrate a lack 
of probable cause, and a lack of a substantial basis for the 
issuance of the warrant. 
The first problem with the warrant and affidavit is that 
they are ambiguous about whether the warrant authorizes search of 
the entire duplex, or just the southern portion of the duplex with 
the 3720 address. The warrant authorizes no-knock nighttime search 
of 
the premises known as a 3720 South 3 375 West, the 
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the 
southern most half of the duplex, the apartment 
to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of 
the premises, to include all containers, rooms, 
attics, and basements found therein. 
(R. 25). The search warrant affidavit contains this same 
description (R. 28). All references in the portions of the 
affidavit relating to the probable cause showing and justifications 
for the no-knock nighttime issuance of the warrant are to "the 
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premises" and are not specific to the entire duplex, or to a 
particular half of the duplex. The magistrate could easily have 
corrected this ambiguity on the face of the no-knock nighttime 
warrant, but apparently overlooked it, unnecessarily risking fatal 
consequences to presumably innocent citizens. The failure of the 
warrant to precisely identify the place to be search violates 
numerous statutory and constitutional provisions. Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-23-1 (1990 Repl. Vol.)("A search warrant is an order 
issued by a magistrate in the name of the state and directed to a 
peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place or 
person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by 
him and brought before the magistrate*")(emphasis added); Utah Code 
Ann. section 77-23-3(1) ("A search warrant shall not issue except 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly 
describing the person or place to be searched and the person, 
property, or evidence to be seized.")(emphasis added); Constitution 
of Utah, Article I section 14 (fl[N]o warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be 
seized.")(emphasis added); United States Constitution, Amendment 
Four (fl[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.11). 
The second facial deficiency in the affidavit is that it 
permits a search for evidence when there was no probable cause as to 
the residents of the premises to be searched, without demonstrating 
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the need for, and without limiting the invasion of, those people7s 
rights. Utah Code Ann. section 77-2 3-3 creates statutory 
requirements that when the police have no probable cause as to the 
people in possession of property subject to seizure, the warrant may 
not issue without the magistrate's specific findings of conditions 
precedent, and that the magistrate must narrow the warrant to limit 
intrusion on the rights of those who are not probable cause 
suspects. It states in subsection (2) as follows: 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is 
evidence of illegal conduct and is in the 
possession of a person or entity for which there 
is insufficient probable cause shown to the 
magistrate to believe that such person or entity 
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct, no 
search warrant shall issue except upon a finding 
by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be 
seized cannot be obtained by subpoena or that 
such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, 
damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena. If 
such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the 
warrant such conditions that reasonably afford 
protection of the following interests of the 
person or entity in possession of such evidence: 
(a) Protection against unreasonable 
interference with normal business; or 
(b) Protection against the loss or 
disclosure of protected confidential sources of 
information; or 
(c) Protection against prior or direct 
restraints on constitutionally protected rights. 
In the instant case, the affidavit does not allege the 
identity of any probable cause suspects, but authorizes the search 
of an occupied home for evidence therein. The warrant contains no 
finding that "the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by 
subpoena or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, 
damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena." The warrant contains no 
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restrictions protecting the no-probable-cause-occupants' 
constitutionally protected rights, but instead authorizes the most 
intrusive and dangerous of searches — a no-knock nighttime search. 
The aiffidavit fails to make an adequate showing of the 
reliability, veracity and basis of knowledge of the confidential 
informants. Other than the allegations concerning Detective 
McCarthy's perception that the vehicular traffic at the premises to 
be searched Wcis consistent with drug trafficking, the affidavit 
relies exclusively on information from three confidential informants 
(the first source, the second source, and the second family 
member)(R. 3 0-3 3). None of the confidential informants had 
witnessed any drug transactions inside the premises to be searched 
(R. 3 0-3 3). In asserting that the spouse had admitted to the first 
source and the second family member that the premises to be searched 
was his source for cocaine (R. 30-33), the affidavit presents 
hearsay on hearsay. The affidavit does not establish any prior 
experience between these sources and Detective McCarthy to establish 
their reliability and veracity. The affidavit indicates that the 
first source is reliable, in part because the source had not been 
promised or paid anything, but the affidavit makes no such averment 
about the second source and the second family member (R. 31). This 
information from the confidential informants fails to demonstrate 
probable cause. See State v. Bailey, supra (requiring a showing of 
confidential informants' veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge to establish probable cause). 
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B. THE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF THE NO-KNOCK 
NIGHTTIME WARRANT. 
1. Search warrant affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime search 
warrants must meet specific criteria. 
No-knock nighttime searches involve severe dangers to 
searching officers and others inside or near the premises to be 
searched, extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the 
home, and the destruction of property. See State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 
730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11, (Utah App.)(main opinion and 
concurring opinion of Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by 
no-knock nighttime search warrants), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08, 313 n.12 
(1958)(interpreting federal knock and announce statute); LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 4.8(a) at 272-273; State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 
700, 701 (Utah 1988). No-knock nighttime searches have met with 
judicial disfavor throughout the history of the United States. See 
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). 
Because of the dangers historically recognized in no-knock 
nighttime searches, magistrates are to proceed with caution in 
evaluating search warrant affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime 
search warrants. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah 
App.)(Garff, J., concurring)("[W]henever a 'canned,' or pre-printed 
affidavit is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative 
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying 
the search warrant. Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the 
affidavit are insufficient. This is particularly critical when the 
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warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home."), 
cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 
700, 703-04 (Utah 1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining the 
need for judicial scrutiny of no-knock searches). 
Even when no-knock nighttime search warrants are issued in 
compliance with pertinent statutes, the searches still must meet 
constitutional standards of reasonableness. See Ker v. California. 
374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963); United States v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971, 
973-74 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 860 (1986); Bovance v. 
Mvers. 398 F.2d 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968); State v. Lindner. 592 P.2d 
852, 858 (Idaho 1979), LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.7(b) 264-267; 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739 n.ll (Utah App.), cert, granted, 
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
2. The search warrant affidavit does not justify a no-knock warrant. 
Undei: Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2), in order to issue 
a no-knock warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit 
or supplemented record which provide "proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given.11 (Emphasis added). The requirement of "proof, under 
oath" in the no-knock statute is stronger than the "probable cause" 
or "reasonable cause" showings that must be made prior to the 
general issuance of search warrants and the issuance of nighttime 
Wcirrants. This strong statutory language is consistent with 
judicial recognition of the dangers and destruction involved in 
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no-knock searches, discussed supra. 
The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory 
prerequisite to the issuance of a no-knock warrant, that "the object 
of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or 
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2). 
The first basis for the no-knock warrant proferred in the 
affidavit is as follows: "Your affiant firmly believes it always 
safer for all participants, police officers, participants and 
non-participants to the sales operation if the officers have the 
safety of an unannounced entry." (R. 32). As the Utah Supreme Court 
established in Lindbeck, supra, affidavits based on the belief of 
the affiant and failing to show the underlying facts do not allow 
for independent evaluation by the magistrate, and warrant issuing on 
the basis of such warrants violate Article I section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution.1 
1. After questioning the logic of Detective McCarthy's 
testimony that no-knock nighttime warrants are the safest in drug 
cases (T. 66-74), and despite the detective's testimony that someone 
was killed during the detective's most recent experience involving a 
nighttime warrant T. 29), the trial court concluded that the court 
had no expertise in the execution of no-knock warrants, and deferred 
to the testimony of the detective that safety compelled the issuance 
of the no-knock warrant (R. 67-68). In so ruling, the trial court 
failed to provide an independent review of the issuance of the 
no-knock warrant, and overlooked a wealth of case law recognizing 
the extremely dangerous and instrusive nature of no-knock warrants 
and the need for careful scrutiny of affidavits in support of such 
warrants. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and 
nn.10 and 11, (Utah App.)(main opinion and concurring opinion of 
Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by no-knock nighttime search 
(footnote continues) 
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The second basis for the no-knock warrant proferred in the 
affidavit is as follows: "Your affiant has been on numerous 
narcotics search warrants w[h]ere weapons have been readily 
available to the occupants. Further your affiant knows from 
training and experience that more and more narcotics dealers are 
arming themselves to protect the sales operations from other 
dealers/users." (R. 32-33). This allegation is too general to 
constitute "proof under oath" that harm would result from 
announcement of the execution of the warrant. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-23-10(2). All people protected by the Utah Constitution are 
entitled to keep and bear arms, Constitution of Utah, Article I 
section 6, and the exercise of this right by some people in the 
Detective's experience is no basis for risking a no-knock search 
upon the residence of people where drug paraphernalia may be found, 
particularly in the absence of any facts specific to the residents 
of the home relating to the paraphernalia or weapons. 
(footnote 1 continued) 
warrants), cert. granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); Miller v. United 
States. 357 U.S. 301, 306-08, 313 n.12 (1958)(interpreting federal 
knock and announce statute); LaFave, Search and Seizure. 
section 4.8(a) at 272-273; State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 
1988); Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); and 
Miller v. United States. 357 U.S. 301 (1958). 
More importantly, in assessing the propriety of the 
no-knock nighttime search warrant, the court should have focused on 
the affidavit, rather than the detective's testimony. See 
generally. Rowe. 
In any event, it appears that in assessing the propriety of 
the issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant, this Court 
simply reviews the affidavit, and does not review the analysis of 
the trial court. See Rowe. 
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As the third basis for the issuance of the no-knock 
warrant, the affidavit alleges, "Further the supplier at the named 
premises has passed along threats to the spouse about police 
intervention in the illicit operation." (R. 33). As reference to 
the entire affidavit reflects, the threats were from the dealer to 
the spouse, and from the spouse to the first confidential informant, 
and were unspecified inducements not to report the drugs to the 
police (R. 31 55 1 and 2). These threats demonstrate only that the 
drug source did not want the spouse to report the drugs, and that 
the spouse did not want the first confidential source to report the 
drugs, and do not constitute "proof under oath" that harm would 
result from the announcement of the search. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-23-10(2). 
The final basis for the issuance of the no-knock warrant 
states, "Lastly the property being sought pursuant to this 
warrant/affidavit is very easily destroyed." (R. 33). The warrant 
in this case did not seek authorization for seizure of narcotics, 
but only for other evidence of possession and intent to distribute 
narcotics, such as drug paraphernalia (R. 29). Because this 
evidence is not at risk of being quickly destroyed or hidden, it did 
not provide a basis for the no-knock warrant. See Rowe at 733-734 
n.3 ("A more particularized showing may well be required if, for 
example, a large quantity of drugs is sought. In such cases, as 
where the affiant has information of the ongoing cultivation or 
manufacture of drugs, the exigency of ready destructability, 
-25-
inherent with small quantities of drugs, may not be present.11).2 
3. The search warrant affidavit does not justify a nighttime warrant. 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1), in order to issue 
a nighttime warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit 
or supplemental record which provide "a reasonable cause to believe 
a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good 
reason[.]" Under the current statute, it is not enough for the 
issuance of the nighttime warrant to show that the evidence is 
likely to be present at night; there must be a reason why the search 
must occur at night, rather than during the day. State v. Rowe. 806 
P.2d 730, 733 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.7(b) 2 64 and n.20. 
The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory 
prerequisite to the issuance of a nighttime warrant, that "a search 
is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good 
reason[.]fl Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(1). There is nothing in the 
2. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled 
that the no-knock warrant was justified, in part because, "of the 
potential of the detsruction of evidence, particularly where small 
amounts may be involved[. ]!l (R. 67). This portion of the trial 
court's ruling was clearly erroneous inasmuch as the warrant was not 
seeking drugs, but was seeking such items as paraphernalia, 
residency records, currency and packaging supplies. 
In any event, it appears that this Court need not address 
the trial court's analysis, but may simply assess the adequacy of 
the affidavit. See Rowe. 
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affidavit explaining why the premises to be searched had to be 
searched at night, rather than in the day. As previously discussed, 
the evidence to be seized was not evanescent, and there is nothing 
to indicate that its seizure was more necessary at night than in the 
day. The affidavit itself indicates that drug trafficking allegedly 
had occurred as late as 2:00 a.m. at the premises to be searched (R. 
31) , thus counselling against the nighttime search. See State v. 
Rowe. 806 P.2d 730f 734 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)("For example, if the 
supporting affidavit made a particularized showing that drugs were 
likely to be sold or consumed over the course of the night and 
evidence thereby lost, or that the supply was likely to be 
imminently moved en masse to a different location during the night, 
or that a safer search was likely at night because the house was 
abustle with activity during the day and no one but the occupant was 
likely to be home at night, then the propriety of a nighttime search 
becomes manifest. We caution that a mere incantation of such 
circumstances will not justify a nighttime search—the required 
factual showing is not one which is conducive, for example, to 
pre-printed language.")(emphasis added), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). See generally Rowe; State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 
(Utah App. 1989). The fact that the SWAT team who executed this 
warrant without Detective McCarthy saw fit to do so in the daytime 
demonstrates that the nighttime search was not necessary or 
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appropriate (T. 20-23).3 
III. 
SUPPRESSION IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY. 
The violations in this case are substantive and require 
suppression. The affidavit and warrant are too vague to support a 
finding of probable cause to search, particularly in a no-knock 
nighttime manner, and constitute violations of the fourth amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Because the magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search 
warrant without an affidavit or supplementation of the affidavit 
that meets the statutory and constitutional muster, suppression is 
the appropriate remedy. Rowe at 738. The legislature did not 
indicate that violations of the no-knock and nighttime statutes 
should be exempt from suppression. Compare Utah Code Ann. section 
77-23-6 ("Failure to give or leave a receipt shall not render the 
evidence seized inadmissible at trial.") with Utah Code Ann. section 
77-23-10(2)(no-knock statute; does not prohibit suppression), and 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1)(nighttime statute; does not 
3. The trial court did not reach the merits of the 
nighttime aspect of the warrant, ruling that the fact that the SWAT 
team exectuted the warrant during the day mooted or cured the 
defective warrant (R. 68). In so ruling, the trial court failed to 
appreciate the importance of meaningful assessment of affidavits 
seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants, and the crucial role of 
judicial review in the enforcement of fundamental rights to 
privacy. See appendix to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 740-743 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, granted. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
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prohibit suppression).4 
Given the state constitutional rights to life, privacy, 
property and the proper issuance of warrants, which are all at stake 
in no-knock nighttime search cases, suppression is the appropriate 
remedy for the improper issuance of no-knock nighttime search 
warrants. See Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 ("All men 
have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property[.]"); 
Article I section 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law."); Article I section 14 
("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."); State v. 
LaRocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-73 (Utah 1990)(plurality)(adopting 
exclusionary rule under Article I section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, and reserving judgment on whether or not the court 
will adopt exceptions to the Utah exclusionary rule). 
4. Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-12 indicates that "property 
or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be 
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceedings unless the 
unlawful conduct of the peace officer is shown to be substantial," 
but it appears that this statute, which is part of the Fourth 
Amendment Enforcement Act, is no longer in effect, inasmuch as the 
Utah Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a different provision 
of the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, and the act indicates that 
the provisions are not severable, but fall together if one provision 
is stricken. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987). 
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The federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule 
has not been and should not be adopted under the exclusionary rule 
of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See Rowe at 
737-738 and appendix to Rowe opinion at 740-743. Even if the "good 
faith" exception could be applied in this state, it does not apply 
in this case because no officer could rely in good faith on the 
barebones affidavit at issue here. See Rowe at 738 (good faith 
exception does not apply when magistrate acts as a rubber stamp). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court,s denial of 
Mr. White's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
• ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this y day of August, 1992. 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for ,Mr, White 
-H " 
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Attorney for Mr1). White 
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APPENDIX 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United states provides: 
Sectd on 1. 
Al] persons born or natural ized I n the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and ot 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shal 1 abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of 1 ife, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protect! on of the laws, 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be appor tioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congressr the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of 
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participati on 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age i n such State. 
Sect:! 
_ erson shal 1 be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or el ector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any offi ce, 
civi 1 or in i litary, under the United States, or 
under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Const it lit ion 
of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection, or rebellion against the same or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Hint 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the 
United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
bY appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of 
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest 
against wrongs, and petition for redress of 
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden— 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code - •? ._ _ , „ • - - . .. ~jpp.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
7 7 - 1 3. De£Initions. 
For the purpose of this act: 
.»*.]. -Mare'* means a justice of 
the Supreme Courr o -H;*^ if the district 
courts, a judge ol the juvenile courts, a 
judge cf the circuit courts and a justice of 
the ea<:o - r : " -•(( r *n_ coin: t created by 
. , "
l
 ' o 1 ) provides: 
77-<* search warrant11 defined. 
-. *rch warrant is an order issued by a 
naq -; :i in the name of the state and directed 
to J peao~ crficer, describing with particularity 
the thing, place or person to be searched and the 
property or evidence to be seized by him and 
brought before the magistrate. 
Utah Code Ann sect i on 7 7 -2 3 - 2 (1990 Pep1. Vo1.) prov ides: 
77- 23-2. Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant 
to a search warrant Ir 4 } ;ere * s probable cause to 
believe that "t* 
. i . l a w i • 1 i of in I red oi is 
unlawfully possessed 
(2) Has been used or is possessed for 
the purpose of being used to commit or 
conceal the commission of an offense; or 
(' Is evi dence of illegal conduct. 
i l l ( i l l i o d e i, in i mi in .i»< I i o n , 1 I i I i MI " ) p r o v i d e s : 
77-23-3. Conditions precedent : issuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation particularly describing the person or 
place to be searched and the person, property or 
evidence to be seized, 
i£ the item sought to be seized i s 
o in Ii in i» of illegal conduct and i s in the 
pUooLSsion of a person or entity for which tl lere 
is insufficient probable cause shown to the 
magistrate to nelieve that such person or entity 
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct, no 
search warrant shall issue except upon a finding 
by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be 
seized cannot be obtained by subpoena or that 
such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, 
damaged, or altered if sought by subpoena. If 
such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the 
warrant such conditions that reasonably afford 
protection of the following interests of the 
person or entity in possession of such evidence: 
(a) Protection against unreasonable 
interference with normal business; or 
(b) Protection against the loss or 
disclosure of protected confidential sources 
of information; or 
(c) Protection against prior or direct 
restraints on constitutionally protected 
rights. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-23-4. Examination of complainant and 
witnesses—Witness not in physical presence of 
magistrate—Duplicate original warrants—Return. 
(1) All evidence to be considered by a 
magistrate in the issuance of a search 
warrant shall be given on oath and either 
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. 
Transcription of the recorded testimony need 
not precede the issuance of the warrant. 
Any person having standing to contest the 
search may request and shall be provided 
with a transcription of the recorded 
testimony in support of the application for 
the warrant. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-23-5. Time for service—Officer may request 
assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction 
in the warrant that it be served in the daytime, 
unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a 
reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary 
in the night to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, 
or for other good reason; in which case he may 
insert a direction that it be served any time of 
the day or night. An officer may request other 
persons to ass i st h i m in conducts ng the search. 
Utah i ode Ann e t I KHII I'MMI l /cpl nil | p r o v i d e s : 
77-23-6. Receipt for property taken. 
When the officer seizes property pursuant to 
a search warrant, he shall give a receipt to the 
person from, whom i t was seized or in whose 
possession it was found. If no person is 
present, the officer shall leave the receipt in 
the place where he found the property. Failure 
to give or leave a receipt shall not render the 
evidence sei zed i nadmissible at trj a ] 
Ldi: Jode Ann MM:1! IUIII /' " ,'" I III | 111"' i" M I l < v p l 'i Il )i p N i v j i i t ' i ; i n 
pertinent part : 
77-23-10. Force used in executing warrant 
Notice of authority prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the 
officer executing the warrant nay use such force 
as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(2) Wi thout notice of his authority 
an(^ purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give noti ce , The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, 
under oath, that the object of the search 
may be quickly destroyed,, di sposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result 
to any person if notice were gi ven. 
APPENDIX 2 
SEARCH WARRANT AND AFFIDAVIT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT n UJRT 
T I I.I MINT i • I A IE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO 
ONTY I'E' MVP LAM.', IVTA'IK ij].1 UTAH 
any peace officer in n.he state of Utah. 
Dof by affidavit; under oath having been made this day before me by L)et, 
II McCarthy, 1 am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
it ( | un z\v\ peri'jonu or 
{ ) in th*j, vehicles described as 
(X) on the premises known as a 3720' SOUTH 3375 WEST, the duplex on 
i west side of the road, 3 720 is the southern most half of the duplex, the 
irtment to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of the premises, to 
rlude all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein. 
In the City of WEST VALLEY, County of Salt Lake, State of Otah, there 
now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described 
SEE' Al TACHMENT "A" 
ch property or evidence: 
(x) was un lawfully accuse- or is unlawfully possessed or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense- -
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use i*. as ~ -•-••-
committing or concealing a public offense or 
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of , t, 
possessed by a party to the. illegal conduct 
are therefore commanded: 
". * a: . •• * :ood cause having been sho1 vn) 
\ , execute witnout notice of authority or purpose,. 
proof under oath being snown that the object of th i. b 
sear: . ~ ^  , i U ^ : : K 2 ^ >-r*~royed or disposed of or 
t'l- • * f 1" person If notice, were given.) 
i I ll ,l ^  \ 




1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 




make a search of the above-named or described person (s), vehicle(s) , and 
»mises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
i same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third 
cuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Dtah, or retain such property in 
x custody, subject to the order of this court. 
EN UNDER MY HAND and dated this y / day of ^ ^ ^ , 1 9 9 1 . 
^ -rz 
JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR 
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT COURT 
UU027 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That ( ) on the person of 
( ) in the vehicle described as 
(X) on the premises known as 3720 SOUTH 33 75 WEST, the 
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the southern most half 
of the duplex, the apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on 
the front of the premises, to include all containers, rooms, attics 
and basements found therein. 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, there is now certain property of evidence described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct, (Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
i>0028 




1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED -TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds tor issuance ot a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by 
the West Valley City Police Department. Your affiant was assigned 
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force for a period of over three 
years. Your affiant is presently assigned to the West Valley City 
Police Department, Detective Division, and is assigned to 
investigate narcotic related offenses occurring within West Valley 
City. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and 
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has 
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in 
relation to police investigations. Affiant was assigned to the 
Metro Narcotics Strike Force for over 3 years. Your affiant is a 
certified peace officer in the State of Utah for over 10 years. 
Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic and 
advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California 
Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug recognition, 
identification and investigative techniques and Alcohol Tobacco and 
Firearms Undercover Investigative Techniques. 
Further your affiant would like to inform the courts that your 
affiant has been the affiant or has assisted in the preparation and 
service of several hundred narcotic search warrants. Also several 
of those search warrants were surveillance search warrants. 
Your affiant had received information from a confidential 
informant that the suspects at the listed address are dealing in 
narcotics. Your affiant believes that the information provided by 
the CI i s r^yr^tfii rtnrl truthful ?nr 1-Ko fnl 1 riT.rvmj- i h.ing _ Thg CI 
information^j_g f:i ^s£-.hanri ^ and from personal observations j Further 
/the CI has no&^pf&mised nor paiH anything for the Information 
provided. Lastly your affiant has corroborated the information 
provided by the CI from a separate source. 
Your affiant was told by the CI that the persons residing at 
the premises listed are trafficking in narcotics. The CI basis this 
belief on the following. The CI reports that over the last 6 months 
the CI's spouse has been purchasing cocaine from the listed 
premises. Further the CI has been to the named premises on at least 
two occasions when the CI's spouse did ii^ ^^ cjL^ Tii^ chase cocaine. 
The most recent purchase being withinrtHe" .last 5 days^Your affiant 
was further told by the CI that the ci Ras never been inside the 
named premises and actually observed a transaction, however the CI 
has observed th€> CI's spouse enter then "5X11, trie named premisesT 
AfirSr the CI's has exitea "f5e named premises the CI has observed 
the^ jigLause ingest cocaine. Further the spouse has indicated to the 
CI that the persons inside the named prpmisfts—ajM—the—spouses 
supplier of cocaine. __ 
O0030 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT -
CI told your affiant that the CI has been threatened by the 
spouse if the CI came forward to the police with the information 
provided. Further the CI was told by the spouse that the supplier 
of—the r-nr^ inp hag ^h^ 0^ op^d thp sprm<^ <*-wfren^ the spouse has seen! 
late in repaying for cocaine that was received^by ttrer spouse. 
Your affiant has interviewed a second source of information 
who has observed the spouse at the pained premises. Your affiant was 
also told by the second source' that the spouse has a long history 
of substance abuse, cocaine. Your affiant cannot disclose the 
identity of the CI nor the second source for fear it would 
jeopardize each real identity to the supplier. Further your affiant 
was told by the CI that the CI has been threatened by the spouse 
that the supplier would "get even" if the CI went to the police. 
Your affianfe—b^lieves that the information from the second 
sourcer^Ts accur^rte^ahd truthful for the following reasons. The 
sources information ±s first hand and further the second source is 
a ^relative of the spouse. Further your affiant has reviewed the 
criminal history of the spouse and the spouse does show prior 
arre^t^for narcotics.. 
Your affiant has been to the named premises and has observed 
what your affiant believes to be narcotics traffic. Your affiant 
has held surveillance on the named premises and has observed 
vehicles arrive and stay a very short period of time. 
Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing for the 
following reasons. The CI states to your affiant that the spouse 
has been using cocaine for over 2 years. CI states that the spouse 
has been purchasing cocaine from the named premises for at least 
the last 6 months. The CI has observed the spouse ingest the 
cocaine intravenously for over the last year. Further the CI has 
been to the named premises and has observed the spouse enter then 
exit the named premise with cocaine, the most recent being within 
the last 5 days. 
Your affiant was told by a second ramxiy member that the 
spouse does have a cocaine abuse problem and further that the 
spouse has been observed at the named premises, then later admitted 
to have purchased cocaine at the named premises. 
Lastly your affiant was told by the CI that the CI has been to 
the named premises as late as 2:00 am with the spouse to purchase 
peai^e. CI also tolcr^ y^ ur a m a m : that the spouse has inges±pri 
_docdlne—«n>idtf Lhe—rrametr^ premisQ-s" While purchasing additional 
^uMrt rg teap^ggs^rsona inrog: 
Your a f f i an t bel ieves tha t the named premises should be 
searched for packaging material as well as drug paraphernalia. Your 
u o 
PAGE FOUR 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
affiant knows from training and experience that suspect's selling 
narcotics often keep instruments used in the ingestion of narcotics 
on hand to allow customers to test the narcotics to be purchased. 
Further your affiant knows that the packaging material is an 
inherent part of any narcotics sales operation. The packaging 
material is needed to weight out and package additional quantities 
of, narcotics for resale. 
Your affiant believes that the named premise should be 
searched for US currency. Your affiant believes that the currency 
will be in close proximity to the narcotics being searched for and 
further that currency is evidence of the illicit operation. Honey 
is needed to make change during subsequent sales and used to 
replenish depleted narcotic supplies. CI also told your affiant 
that the spouse has spent as much as $1,000.00 in a single day at 
the named premises purchasing cocaine. 
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be 
searched for narcotics records. Your affiant knows from training 
and experience that narcotics dealers frequently keep such list 
identifying amounts sold, persons sold to, amounts owed and 
especially drug indebtness. Your affiant was told that the CI's 
spouse has been threatened over drug indebtness to the suppliers. 
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be 
searched for occupancy papers. Your affiant has checked the utility 
records of the listed premises and they show in the name of 
ZELENIAK, BRIAN and McCARTY, CDLLEN. Your affiant has also observed 
other vehicles at the named premises and would like to identify all 
the occupants for possible future prosecution. 
Your affiant ask the courts not to require your affiant to 
publish the name of the CI for the following reasons. The CI is a 
citizen informant and your affiant fears for CI's personal safety. 
Further your affiant believes if the CI's name is published, 
threats that have been made against the CI will be carried out. 
Your affiant prays for a night time-no knock service search 
warrant. Your affiant has been told that the busiest time of\ \ 
operation is during the late evening hours. Your affiant was toldu 
that the CI has been to the named premises as late as 2:00 am for 
the purpose of purchasing cocaine. . • •—-— 
Your affiant prays for no-knock service for the following 
reasons. Your affiant firmly believes it always safer for all 
participants, police officers, participants and non-participants to 
the sales operation if the officers have the safety of an 
unannounced entry. Your affiant has been on numerous narcotics 
search warrants were weapons have been readily available to the 
occupants. Further your affiant knows from training and experience , 
PAGE FIVE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
that more and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves to 
protect the sales operations from other dealers/users* Further the 
supplier at the named premises has passed along threats to the 
spouse about police intervention in the illicit operation. Lastly 
the property being sought pursuant to this warrant/affidavit is 
very easily destroyed. 
Your affiant has had this warrant reviewed by a Deputy Salt 
Lake County Attorney and it has been approved for presentation to 
the courts. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informants reliable for the following reasons, 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informants to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
(.1)033 
PAGE SIX 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
( ) in the day time, until 7:00pm. 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason 
to believe it is necessary to seize the property 
prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damagedf. 
or altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer 
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of 
the officer's authority or purpose because: 
(X) physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given; or 
(X) the property sought may be quicicly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
FFIANT DEI. BILL MCCARTHY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this JS>/ day of ? Js4*-^\WL< 
JUDGE 7 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oU034 
